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Summary 
 
Transparency is a crucial condition to implement a CSR policy based on the 
reputation mechanism. The central question of this contribution is how a transparency 
policy ought to be organised in order to enhance the CSR behaviour of companies. 
Governments endorsing CSR as a new means of governance have different strategies 
to foster CSR transparency. In this paper we discuss the advantages and disadvantages 
of two conventional policy strategies: the facilitation policy and the command and 
control strategy. Using three criteria (efficiency, freedom and virtue) we conclude that 
both strategies are defective. Most attention is paid to the facilitation strategy since 
governments nowadays mainly use this. In evaluating this strategy we analyze the 
Dutch case. As an alternative we introduce a third government policy: the 
development of a self-regulating sub-system. By construing an analogy with the 
historical development of corporate financial disclosure, we point out that the vital 
step in the creation of a self-regulating subsystem is the creation of strong 
informational intermediate organizations. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The main question of this article is how to design a transparency policy in our latter 
day market society in order for it to foster the development of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). CSR is thereby interpreted as an alternative mechanism to solve 
public problems. The core of it is that companies take responsibility and consider 
themselves accountable for the economic, social and ecological consequences of their 
operations. 
 Our main question is fostered by a problem of contemporary society in general 
and its system of governance in particular. This problem is commonly referred to as 
the problem of “the limits of state action” (Keane, 1988). Today the world faces a 
complex set of ecological and social issues that need resolve. Governmental 
institutions, located at both the nationally and international level, face serious and 
structural difficulties in addressing these issues (Weale, 1992; Yeager, 1991; 
Dubbink, 2003; Scherer, Palazzo and Bauman, 2006). 
The recognition of “the limits of state action” has raised an interest in 
alternative mechanisms for realizing public goals (i.e. in mechanisms of governance). 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is often conceived of as one of these 
alternative mechanisms. From a governmental perspective CSR is closely linked to 
transparency. A transparent organization provides information in such a way that the 
stakeholders involved can obtain a proper insight into the issues that are relevant for 
them (Kaptein, 2003). Transparency is a necessary condition for CSR. CSR will 
remain marginal as a mechanism of governance as long as stakeholders cannot closely 
keep their eye on them. This is not to deny that some managers will be inherently 
motivated for CSR. But for it to become a significant mechanism of governance, 
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stakeholders must be able to see the difference between CSR and window-dressing. 
Besides, all possibilities to make it pay off must be used. This requires that society 
must ensure that corporations are sufficiently transparent. Thus, if there is an effective 
need for CSR in contemporary society, there is also a need for "CSR transparency" - 
as we call it. 
 The need for CSR-transparency contrasts sharply with the present level of 
transparency in contemporary markets. Empirical evidence sufficiently shows that the 
present level of transparency still is largely insufficient. Walden and Schwarz (1997) 
for example, question whether companies will voluntarily report substantive 
environmental information that will adversely affect their future earnings. Most 
disclosures of firms they studied were ‘time and event’-specific. This indicates that 
firms use disclosure mainly to respond to public pressure after incidents. In the same 
vein Owen et al (2000) argue that social audits are monopolized by corporate 
management, which uses this instrument as a means to control public relations. Social 
and environmental disclosures are to a large extent self-laudatory (Hooghiemstra, 
2000). What is more, various studies show that voluntary environmental disclosure is 
not a reliable indicator of a firm’s environmental performance (Berthelot et al, 2003; 
See also Gray, 2001; Walden and Schwarz, 1997; Deegan and Rankin, 1996). Too 
often, companies attempt to change perceptions without changing facts (Hess, 2007; 
see also: Hess and Dunfee, 2007). 
 
This paper looks for the best policy to enhance the CSR-transparency of market 
actors, given the limits of state action. The set-up of the paper is as follows. In the 
next section we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of transparency in relation 
to CSR enhancement. We distil three criteria for assessing a transparency policy. 
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Section three and four describe two public policies with respect to transparency: 
command and controli and a facilitation policy. We accept the conventional criticism 
as to the former and evaluate the latter by describing and analysing a European 
forerunner in this regard: the Dutch case. Thereupon we introduce the basic 
components of yet another policy, labelled self-regulating sub-system and discuss two 
instantiations of this policy. One of these clearly seems superior because it tries to 
employ the newly evolving infomediaries. Again, the Dutch case is important in this 
respect. On the one hand it shows that the idea of self-governing subsystems is not 
just some theoretical whim. On the other hand, it also suggests the importance of 
infomediaries in organizing self-governing subsystems. 
 
Our paper conceptually contributes to the existing body of knowledge on transparency 
theory by (1) showing that the common duality between "self-regulation" and 
"command and control" policies must be rejected, as the common association with 
"voluntary" versus "enforced" policies that goes with it. Self-regulation can refer to 
self-regulating actors and self-regulating subsystems. From a governmental point of 
view, this distinction is crucial. We will show that it changes the assessment of (the 
nature) of various governmental policies and their potential success. Interestingly, we 
are able to make this contribution by relating work done on environmental policy 
assessment in administrative science in the 1990s to contemporary theory on 
transparency. (2) Another conceptual contribution is our attempt to assess 
transparency policies on multi-dimensional criteria. In a liberal society efficiency 
cannot be the only relevant criterion. The moral point of view also counts and as we 
see it, the moral point of view changes our assessment of particular policies. (3) Our 
third contribution relates to the recently evolving literature stressing the importance of 
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infomediaries. In the light of our analysis we are able to back up and elaborate on 
both the importance of this new development and the ways in which this policy can be 
stimulated. 
 
2 Three criteria to evaluate transparency policies 
 
In this section we define three key criteria for evaluating transparency policies by 
means of a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of transparency in relation 
to CSR. 
 
Advantages of transparency 
 
The literature provides several economic and moral arguments why transparency is 
important in relation to CSR. First, transparency enhances allocative efficiency, at 
least if consumers attach value to the social and ecological consequences of the 
products that they buy. Transparency may also enhance dynamic efficiency and 
innovation. Without transparency, companies performing well in CSR cannot 
distinguish themselves from companies that perform badly. This will limit the 
incentive to and necessity of process and product innovation to increase value creation 
in the social and ecological dimension (see Kaptein, 2003 and Graafland et. al., 2004 
and 2006). 
 Transparency can also be defended from the moral point of view. First, 
consumer freedom increases when more information about the characteristics of 
various products is available. This information should also include the CSR relevant 
information of these products. Ethically speaking, informing transaction partners is an 
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important aspect of showing respect to others. Stakeholders have a reasonable right to 
information concerning the reporting company when its activities impinge on their 
interests (Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Gray, 2001). 
 Transparency is also morally important because it enhances an attitude of 
honesty, openness and a commitment to truth that is implicit in thinking on CSR. 
Thus, it has been argued that transparency enhances a sense of accountability and 
responsibility (Kaptein, 2003), again virtues relevant for CSR. The argument here is 
that transparency makes it much easier for stakeholders to confront a company with 
its actions, thereby stimulating a sense of responsibility in the company. Moreover, 
more and better information could have a stimulating effect on the attitude of 
consumers vis-à-vis CSR. Currently consumers often are too passive in this respect. 
More transparency, for example by labelling products, will confront consumers 
directly with the moral consequences of their choice and thus increase their 
willingness to pay for CSR products (Auger et al, 2003; see also Curlo, 1999).  
 
Disadvantages of transparency 
 
All these advantages, however, do not imply that pushing transparency to its limits is 
necessarily a good thing. There are disadvantages attached to striving at full 
transparency. From an economic point of view complete transparency may be costly 
to society. Although communication technology has diminished information costs, the 
stakeholders’ right to information can be very costly to individual firms.ii This is 
further complicated by the fact that many aspects of CSR cannot be measured very 
accurately. Another problem is the bounded rationality of stakeholders. Because of 
the limited cognitive powers and restricted time for absorbing information, an 
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overload of information may cause the user to overlook the most important 
information or even to refrain from inspecting the information (Conlisk, 1996; Rabin, 
1998; Fung et al, 2004). KPMG finds that stakeholders do not derive a direct 
measurable value from the voluminous environmental reports of large companies.iii 
As a result, its effectiveness in realizing either allocative efficiency or long run 
dynamic efficiency through innovation may be limited. 
A moral consideration against full transparency concerns company freedom. 
Although entrepreneurs and managers should inform their stakeholders, complete 
transparency and the resulting burden of compiling the necessary information may 
come into conflict with company freedom. Full transparency may come into conflict 
with other moral principles, such as the right to privacy of workers or other parties. 
Transparency must also not disproportionately endanger the interests of the company 
that provides the information (Council for the Annual Reports, 2003). This actually 
involves more than company secrets. If many companies in a sector conceal 
information that is sensitive and harmful for them, the fully transparent firm may 
suffer a disproportionate amount of damage. 
Yet another consideration is that full transparency may in fact turn companies 
against taking moral responsibility and thus CSR. Demanding full transparency may 
hinder the enhancement of virtues like honesty, openness and integrity. Although 
modest external pressure certainly can stimulate the internalisation of these virtues, 
beyond a certain level external pressure may also have a negative effect. It may feed 
an attitude of minimal compliance and distrust. This negative effect is particularly 
strong when companies are not able to deliver reliable information or lack the best 
practices of CSR (KPMG, 2006). 
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Three criteria for the evaluation of transparency 
 
On the basis of the above discussion we distil three criteria for evaluating 
transparency policies: efficiency, freedom and virtue. With regard to the first 
criterion, any transparency policy should raise the quality of information at an 
affordable cost level. Transparency will only be efficient if the quality of the 
information is good and if the information can be provided at low costs. In the 
literature several procedural standards for transparency in social audits and social 
reports have been developed to secure the quality of information (Zadek et al, 1997; 
Wartick and Wood, 1999; Graafland, 2002). Table 1 presents an overview of 
procedural standards with respect to CSR information (Kaptein, 2003). 
 
Table 1 Procedural standards for transparency in social reports 
Completeness ABCD External verification AD 
Inclusivity ABC Impartiality AD 
Relevance / evolution ABD Attention for Sustainability A 
Comparability  ABC Process governance B 
Comprehensibility / clarity ACD Organizational embedment C 
Timeliness / Evolution AB Consistency C 
Public disclosure AC Continuous improvement C 
Verifiability AC Information quality / reliability D 
a
 A: Global Reporting Initiative; B: Accountability 1000; C: Institute for Social and Ethical 
AccounAbility; D: Guideline Insurance 100 IFAC. Source: Kaptein (2003). 
 
The second and third criterion—freedom and virtue—are moral in nature. Any 
transparency policy should ideally respect the freedom of both companies and 
stakeholders. It should also be conducive to the development of virtues like openness, 
awareness and honesty. The three criteria are closely connected. For instance, in the 
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procedural standards reported in Table 1 the development of a virtuous organisation is 
implicit. 
 
3 Command and control versus facilitation policy 
 
Experts in social reporting have recently explored the various ways in which 
government may enhance CSR transparency (see: Hess, 2007). Customary, these 
experts distinguish between two government policies: command and control policy 
with mandatory disclosure and self-regulatory, new governance or facilitating policy 
based on voluntary disclosure (Rhunka and Boerstler, 1998; Berthelot et al, 2003; 
KPMG, 2006; Hess, 2007).iv These two strategies correspond quite well with a 
standard typology of possible governmental strategies as developed within 
administrative science over the last decades. Here academics usually distinguish 
between "command and control policy" and "facilitation policy" (Van Vliet, 1992). 
 ‘Command and control’ is a standard term for making policy by means of 
legislating, implementing and maintaining coercive laws. Command and control is 
often considered to be the traditional way in which government can attempt to steer 
societal processes (Stone, 1975; Van Vliet, 1992). Geared to transparency politics, 
command and control policy means that the government regulates the transparency of 
companies by forcing companies to provide certain types of information (Kolk et al, 
2001)v. For example, the government can force companies to publish information 
about environmental and labour issues in their annual report. Such a command and 
control transparency policy has to consist of three elements. There must be a set of 
rules disciplining companies to come up with CSR data on a regular basis. But the 
necessary control, inspection and prosecution processes must also be in place 
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(KPMG, 2006). This relates to both the data and the process of their deliverance. 
Lastly, the information must be rightly interpreted and disseminated to relevant 
audiences. 
 
The core of the facilitation strategy is that government conceives of companies as 
'self-governing actors' or ‘cooperative citizens’ (Hafkamp and Molenkamp, 1990: 
240), not unwilling to participate in the process of government. Given this policy the 
cardinal task of the government is to stimulate the societal actors to assume that role 
and to shape the conditions for it. This can be done by providing information, 
subsidies etc.. Applied to the issue of transparency a facilitation policy can employ 
various instruments (See Table 2). 
 
Table 2 Examples of instruments belonging to a facilitating strategy 
Subsidies  
Awards for best practices 
Research to model code of conduct 
Labelling and harmonizing existing labels and certifications 
Research to transparency benchmark, CSR reputation index, transparency scan etc. 
 
Other 
Establishment of an information centre providing public information about social labels and specific 
subjects 
Labels or certification as condition for licences 
Publicly expressed support of codes of conduct   
 
An option is subsidizing or granting awards for best practices in transparency. The 
government can also subsidize labelling organizations and investigate the desirability 
and feasibility of harmonizing existing labels (Lange and Winkler, 2000). By helping 
companies or sectors to set up a reliable product or process label, the government 
contributes to the reliability of the information about CSR. A final example of 
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financial facilitation is subsidizing research on reputation indices, or, as in the 
Netherlands, benchmarking of transparency (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004).vi  
 Facilitation is not just about financial instruments. At its core it consists of 
"communicative instruments". An example of a communicative instrument is the 
establishment of a CSR information centre. This centre must provide and disseminate 
independent and reliable information on CSR. This may involve information on 
socially responsible best business practice, (the establishment of) model codes of 
conduct or information on social labels (Lange and Winkler, 2000). Another 
instrument is the creation of websites on specific subjects. The government can also 
importantly influence a company’s CSR transparency by rewarding the establishment 
of information systems and certification policies by companies. It can for example 
relieve certain conditions of licences or lower punishments, in relation to particular 
violations. Third, the government can promote transparency by symbolic actions, such 
as publicly expressed support. 
 
Interestingly, many academics involved in transparency policy today, stand 
favourably to the idea of self-governing actors. Ruhnka and Boerstler (1998), for 
example, argue that in the past the shift of US policy from negative incentives to 
positive incentives coincided with a substantial rise in corporate codes. This may also 
work for CSR reporting (See also Hess, 2007). What is more, currently governments 
have also put their hopes on the facilitation policy with respect to CSR transparency. 
The Dutch government provides an interesting example. Clearly a frontrunner in 
Europe, this government explicitly casts its CSR transparency policy in terms of 
command and control versus facilitation and has opted for the latter.  
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4 The limits of both policies (The Dutch case 1) 
 
Will either the command and control policy or the facilitation policy be effective in 
enhancing CSR-transparency? In the 1980s and 1990s a rather broad consensus 
evolved both inside politics and in academic circles that command and control politics 
is structurally deficient. It cannot solve any complex problem in modern society (Van 
Vliet, 1992; Weale, 1992). Many problems related to the command and control policy 
are related to the "limits of law" (Keane, 1988; Stone, 1975; Yeager, 1991). We will 
not challenge this consensus and leave aside command and control as a way of 
enhancing CSR policy. Since it is ineffective, we maintain that at least it fails on the 
criterion of efficiency.  
 
What about the facilitation policy? We will use the remainder of this section to 
describe and analyze the Dutch case in order to assess the facilitation policy. 
Facilitation is the dominant government policy with regard to CSR transparency in the 
Netherlands (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2007). The Dutch government uses the 
entire range of transparency policies introduced in table 2. It awards best practices, 
develops CSR toolkits, master classes in sustainability etc. The Dutch government 
disseminates information about CSR through a national organisation (NCP) and 
several websites.vii The Dutch government has also defined minimum CSR 
requirements for companies eligible to make use of various governmental export and 
investment facilities. Companies must declare to be acquainted with the OECD 
guidelines and make the greatest possible effort to apply these. Moreover, government 
support in exporting is only available for companies that meet some concrete 
requirements related to the environment, corruption and social aspects. Finally, the 
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Dutch government has issued research aimed at developing a conceptual framework 
for social reporting. This has resulted in the publication of the Guideline 400 of the 
Council for the Annual Reports (2003, see footnote 17). 
 
How does Dutch facilitation policy fare in relation to our three criteria? We maintain 
that the Dutch case makes it abundantly clear that the facilitation policy fails in terms 
of its efficiency. Despite the employment of all the mentioned instruments, CSR 
transparency of Dutch companies has still remained low. Many of the procedural 
standards reported in Table 1 are currently not met by Dutch companies. Public 
disclosure often is very limited. Several indicators point at this. For example, 
according to the transparency benchmark of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(2004) only 5 % of the large companies meet all criteria of the benchmark.viii While 
trying to construct a benchmark for CSR, Graafland and Eijffinger (2004) found that 
the amount of publicly available information on CSR is too limited for this goal. 
Information is also incomplete and not very relevant for several types of 
stakeholders. The principle of completeness means that no area can be systematically 
excluded from the social report. This principle is important to ensure that the 
company does not deliberately hide areas of its activities that will show – on 
inspection – negative social or ecological performance (De Laat, 2001). Still, the CSR 
platform in the Netherlandsix, which represents NGO's industry and government, 
insists that too many companies provide too little and too fragmentised information 
about the supply chain of their products and the labour conditions under which they 
are made. 
Furthermore, the information provided in social reports also lacks comparability. 
The principle of comparability means that the information presented in the CSR report 
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can be compared to information about the performances in different periods or to 
information presented by other relevant organizations. Comparability makes it 
possible to assess the evolution of the CRS performance of a company. This enables 
stakeholders to compare the various companies and to choose with which company 
they will involve themselves. It also enables companies to identify bottlenecks with 
respect to CSR. Still, in practice comparability is low. Private initiatives have led to a 
high number of hallmarks, thus complicating the use of information for both buyers 
and others users of information. An example is wood. There are many wood related 
hallmarks present in the Netherlands, confusing the consumer. Large companies often 
acknowledge the importance of standardisation (which is, for example, supported by 
the guidelines of Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2002)). But even so, in practice 
there still are substantial differences in how these are applied by companies (Lamoen 
and Tulder, 2001). 
All this corroborates the conclusion that the facilitation policy fails on the 
efficiency criterion. Even if a few large companies have realised substantial progress 
in opening up the societal aspects of their business, the majority of companies has not. 
Since any successful policy must be efficient, we can ignore the assessment of the 
facilitation policy in terms of freedom and virtue. 
 
5 A third policy: self-regulating sub-systems 
 
Administrative science of the past decades has stressed time and again that we tend to 
conceive of the process of governing by means of a mental model in which the 
government is the central – if not the only – actor responsible for and capable of 
changing societal processes (Van Vliet, 1992; Hafkamp and Molenkamp, 1990; 
Kooiman, 1993). When thinking along the lines of this ‘government centred model’ 
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one tends to conceive of the rest of society as passive with regard to the governmental 
issues. Consequently, one tends to overlook the many ways in which complex societal 
forces present in society may contribute or hamper the process of governing. Both the 
command and control policy and the facilitation policy are entrenched in this 
government centred model and hampered by it. In attempting to organize society both 
policies concentrate on the ways in which the government can influence actors at the 
micro-level.  
 Another way of conceiving of the process of governing is by means of a 
governance or system approach (See: Teubner and Willke, 1984; Kooiman, 1993; see 
also: Luhmann, 1988). In the system approach society is conceived of as a complex 
body of interrelated subsystems. Each contains forces of many kinds and all of them 
together form one complex system. The government is one of these subsystems. Still, 
it holds a unique position as it has the power to influence the structure of other 
subsystems. If we look at the process of governing from the system approach it 
becomes natural to strive towards self-regulating subsystems. In this context self-
regulation of a subsystem can be defined as a situation in which the balance of forces 
within the subsystem results in the attainment of a state of affairs that coincides with 
the ultimate governmental goal of a well organized society, under the condition that 
there are minimal governmental maintenance costs involved. The definition implies 
that a fully self-regulating system is an ideal. It is important to notice that striving for 
self-regulation within the system does not necessarily mean that no laws are issued or 
that no force whatsoever is used. A self-regulating system is not necessarily grounded 
in voluntarism or self-governance at micro level (See: Hess, 2007: 453). The process 
is geared at constituting self-regulating systems, not self-governing actors. Coercive 
laws thus may be involved. The core of the approach is to find ways to minimize 
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governing costs by the maximum employment of societal forces. It is also important 
to stress that the systems approach does not necessarily imply cooperation between 
government and all societal actors and/or cooperation between all societal actors (See: 
Hess: 455). Quite the contrary, the systems approach may very well be described as a 
policy that tries to employ countervailing powers. The government must try to 
employ and exploit the existing antagonistic forces within society in its strive towards 
self-regulating sub-systems (See: Dubbink, 2003).  
 An exemplary policy suggestion that is in accordance with the system 
approach relates to the goal of ensuring that all motor bikers wear their helmets. 
Governments can try to attain this goal by issuing a law that the police must 
implement by supervision and punishing. It would be in line with the system approach 
to allow health insurance companies to reimburse motor bikers injured in traffic under 
the condition that they wore a helmet at the time. In this way motor bikers are given a 
strong motive to wear a helmet apart from the possibility of being fined. Thus 
maintenance costs are lowered and partly transferred to other parties. 
 
6 A first instantiation of self-regulating subsystems (Dutch case II) 
 
The idea of self-regulating subsystems is very inviting, governmentally speaking. It 
holds the promise of organizing society at low governing costs, since the interplay of 
societal institutions is effectively structured. In fact, the idea of the capitalist free 
market itself bore out of the idea of self-regulating sub-systems. After all, the market 
is legitimized as a sphere of action in which private interest is transformed into public 
benefit by means of the working of a ingenious set of institutions, sometimes 
metaphorically referred to as "the invisible hand" (Baumol, 1975 and 1991; Pigou, 
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1920; Schultze, 1977; see also: Smith, 1776). It thus should come as no surprise that 
proposals have been drawn up to employ the idea of self-regulating systems in 
relation to CSR transparency. An interesting proposal was suggested in the Dutch 
context by the Dutch Consumer Federation (Consumentenbond, 2002). We will 
discuss and evaluate this proposal in some detail. It gives us insight into the 
conditions a policy geared to enhancing self-regulating systems must fulfill. 
 
The basic idea of the Consumer Federation proposal is that companies have a legal 
duty to provide information about the societal aspects of its products, production 
processes and the complete product chain.x Any consumer or societal organization has 
a legal right to demand information from the final suppliers of a product or service. 
This holds true even if the information concerns aspects of the supply chain that the 
final supplier does not directly control. In that case, the supplier’s suppliers should 
deliver the information. The proposal also states that companies have a legal duty to 
develop product manuals. These should contain information on the societal aspects of 
both the product and production processes throughout the chain. Since the proposal 
does not prescribe given formats, it allows the consumer much flexibility. He is able 
to ask any information that he considers relevant in the societal debate. The Consumer 
Federation expects that branch organisations will develop self-regulatory rules to 
work out the need for information on sector level. Still, the company itself is obliged 
to meet the request of the consumer. The company can only deny a request if it can 
show that the requested information does not serve any societal interest or generates 
disproportional advantages or disadvantages to a involved party, violates the right to 
privacy or harms state security interests. 
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Interesting about the proposal of the Consumer Federation is that it is clearly inspired 
by the idea of self-regulating systems. An attempt is made to enhance CSR 
transparency by employing the power of the consumer i.e. consumer sovereignty. The 
power of the consumer is thereby enhanced by a set of governmental measures. Still, 
this latter aspect does not convert the proposal into an instance of command and 
control policy. The proposal suggests using governmental measures to change the 
institutional structure. It is not used directly to put pressure on companies.  
How must we assess this instantiation of the self-regulating systems? We 
believe it must be rejected, even if it has some advantages. The proposal has a 
tendency to convert transparency into an absolute. Thus it neglects the moral limits of 
transparency policies discussed earlier. First, although communication technology has 
diminished information costs, the consumer’s right to demand information can still be 
very costly to individual firms. According to the Consumer Federation, information 
costs do not constitute a legitimate ground for limiting the consumers’ right to 
information. However, these costs can be considerable. This is especially so if 
companies cannot focus on a limited set of core parameters and if companies are 
obliged to provide information on their complete supply chain. 
Another problem is the bounded rationality of consumers. Most consumers 
have limited knowledge of the complex production processes within the production 
chain. This will not only reduce the effectiveness of the transmission of knowledge of 
companies to consumers. It may also cause irrelevant information being requested. 
Although companies have a right to dismiss this type of questions, the costs involved 
in convincing consumers (or courts) that this particular request is irrelevant may be 
substantial. Related to this is the problem that it is often very hard and costly to 
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determine the right level of detail. Too many details only confuse ordinary 
consumers; a shortage on details runs the danger of becoming meaningless.xi 
A moral consideration forcing limits on a transparency policy concerns 
company freedom. A law that requires companies to gather and supply information 
about all kinds of possible societal effects of their operations as well of the operations 
of their (indirect) suppliers in the chain represents a substantial limitation of the 
sphere of freedom for doing business. What is more, the high costs involved in 
absolute transparency are likely to reduce the willingness of companies to cooperate. 
According to KPMG (2006), this will obstruct the development of excellence exactly 
at those companies which are currently in the process of developing it. More generally 
speaking, it must be feared that the proposal may have an adverse effect on the 
company with regard to morality. If companies have to dig up so much information 
on any person's request, they may subsequently deny any further caring responsibility 
(Kaptein, 2003). 
 
Our analysis of the law proposal by the Dutch Consumer Federation makes clear that 
organizing self-regulating systems is no sine cure. Simply enhancing consumer power 
can in the end be contra-productive. Thus, if we want to employ self-regulating 
systems in relation to enhancing CSR transparency we have to develop more nuanced 
proposals. In the last part of this paper we will try to improve the idea of self-
regulating systems; basically by elaborating on one mechanism that we think is 
crucial. This is geared towards strengthening the position and role of the newly 
evolving intermediary information processing organizations. 
 
7 A second instantiation of self-regulating subsystems: using infomediaries 
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In order to work out our proposal we must take a second look at the societal actors 
relevant in thinking on CSR transparency. Despite all the differences between the 
policies discussed so far, (command and control policy, facilitation policy and self-
regulating systems as elaborated on by the consumer federation) they all employ a 
framework in which basically three types of actors participate. These are: (1) the 
individual companies or their representative organisations, (2) individual stakeholders 
in their role as consumer, worker, investor and citizen as well as their representative 
organisations, (3) government. Given this framework, policy is then constantly geared 
at manipulating companies in such a way that they produce information that is 
directly relevant for the various stakeholders.  
 
Here Figure 1 
 
However, as we see it, there is a fourth type of actor present in the contemporary 
social world whose importance seems to increase rapidly. This actor is the 
informational intermediate organisation, the so-called infomediary (see Figure 1). An 
infomediary is a broker in information. It disseminates information to all the different 
parties involved, but especially to the consumer and the interest groups. But that is not 
its only task, perhaps not even its most important task. It also controls, verifies and 
translates information produced by companies. The direct political influence of the 
informational intermediary on companies is and must be limited. Its function is to 
mediate informational contacts between the other types of actors. Still, an important 
sign of the maturity of the infomediary in a given system is the point where the 
companies start using the information provided by the infomediary in its own decision 
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making processes as a means of anticipating to the reactions of the other actors 
involved. 
 During the past decade informational intermediaries have popped up in the 
field of CSR. Consultancy firms, large as well as small, discovered the CSR field and 
often play a double role: they help companies to set up a CSR policy, while at the 
same time performing auditing functions with respect to CSR aspects of company 
policies.xii NGO driven informational organisations not only launch ethical labels but 
also take care of third party control of the label. Ethical screening organisations like 
the London based EIRIS or Paris based VIGEO collect all kinds of CSR information, 
company and non-company based, to deliver a CSR profile of a company and sell this 
information to anyone interested in applying ethical screens to his or her investment 
policy. Many of these screening organisations started out as NGO based initiatives 
and were very small at the beginning. Now they have professionalized in regard to 
their organisational aspects. The same goes for the methodology used to collect and 
screen all publicly available information. Lately, they have organised themselves into 
professional bodies. These are developing their own quality standards with respect to 
the research they do and the quality of the information that is send through.xiii It is not 
only in the gathering and control of CSR information that intermediaries play an 
increasing part. They also have an important role to play in the way information is 
communicated to the public. Purely web based player like "CSRwire" and "Kauri" as 
well as new journals like "P3" in the Netherlands or "Get Up" in Belgium popularise 
recent CSR evolutions very much in the same way as the specialised business or 
investment press does for the financial side of the economy.  
 
Analyzing the structural importance of infomediaries 
 21 
 
So far the rise of infomediaries has been a purely market driven phenomenon. 
Governments have done little to support it. Still, infomediaries seem to be structurally 
functional from a governance perspective. They solve all kinds of problems in the 
interaction between producers and customers, thus enhancing CSR transparency. This 
can be clarified with the concept of information embeddedness. Fung et al. (2006, 
157) has analysed the conditions under which a transparency policy is efficient and 
effective. They maintain that the usefulness of information for users as well as 
disclosers is determined by its incorporation into ordinary decision making processes. 
The more information is thus embedded into the daily decision making of users and 
disclosers, the more successful a transparency policy will be. Fung et al. define a 
series of conditions that determine the embedment of information for users and 
disclosers. We briefly summarize them: 
User:  
• The information should be relevant for the user 
• Compatible with user decision-making processes, this implies that the 
information should be provided in a useful format, in a timely manner and 
easy to find and to interpret and not too costly to collect.  
Discloser: 
• The information must have impact on the decisions of users and change their 
conduct in such a way that it affects core goals of the discloser 
• The discloser should be able to perceive this impact on the user and collecting 
this information should not be too costly 
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Fung et al describe several places were transparency is used as a means to regulate the 
behaviour of actors. They conclude that at this moment the system of corporate 
financial disclosure is probably the most successful example of information streams 
that lead to self-regulation by market participants. Interestingly, this is exactly an 
institutional field where infomediaries play a crucial part. 
 In the field of financial disclosure information is produced by the company. 
This disclosure itself and the format in which it takes place, is to a high extent assured 
by governments. Still, highly sophisticated infomediaries (securities analysts, brokers, 
financial advisors etc.) are a crucial factor. They control, verify and disseminate 
information. They also translate quarterly or annual financial reports by disclosers 
into user friendly data for investors. Rating organisations like Moody’s or Standard 
and Poors for instance transform financial information into a clear indicator that is 
widely used in evaluation policies. Independent accountants verify the correctness of 
the figures provided by the company, while international accounting organisations are 
constantly reviewing the appropriate accounting format in order to make sure that 
financial reports remain comparable over different states and jurisdictions. These 
professionals are themselves regulated through a mixture of self-regulatory bodies and 
stringent legal requirements. After the processing of this complex information, the 
financial information is popularised and disseminated among a broader audience of 
interested stakeholders through many different channels, all directed towards a certain 
type of public, some more demanding with respect to the content of the information 
while others are only interested in a final score. Interestingly, the companies 
themselves closely track the reactions of investors to their financial reporting. 
Intermediaries are again very helpful in passing on this information in a suitable 
format. 
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Evaluating self-regulating systems with infomediaries 
 
We believe that CSR transparency must be enhanced by means of a policy that puts 
self-regulating systems into action. We also hold that in the field of CSR transparency 
any such system must employ infomediaries. In the following we will substantiate our 
position by evaluating this proposal in terms of our three criteria (efficiency, freedom 
and virtue). Since the development of infomediaries is still in its infancy in relation to 
CSR transparency, we will also refer to the field of financial disclosure to make our 
argument.  
A system of CSR transparency is efficient when it can produce information that 
fulfils certain procedural criteria at affordable costs. Let us first look at the latter 
aspect. Cost efficiency is crucial for a process of enhancing CSR transparency. One of 
the difficulties with the proposal by the consumer federation discussed above were the 
excessive costs it generated. Every consumer could ask any CSR information from a 
company. If intermediaries collect the information a company only needs to 
communicate with a limited number of organisations. Thus the cost-benefit ratio 
connected to disclosure is improved. 
 Enhancing the procedural quality of the CSR information is another challenge 
in relation to enhancing CSR transparency (see table 1). Again, infomediaries can 
make a difference. First, third party intermediaries can assure the objectivity of the 
information produced. Completeness is another procedural standard for CSR reporting 
that is not met today. In the end all companies are selective in their reporting, even 
those acknowledging that transparency pays off in terms of stakeholder relationships 
and reputation management. Intermediary organisations are expected to deliver all 
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publicly available information and in general have no interest in withholding part of 
that information. This will secure the completeness of the CSR information. 
Comprehensibility and comparability are yet other procedural standard not 
met by companies. Current social reporting is designed to serve a non-professional 
audience. It contains smooth texts illustrated by attractive pictures, but with little 
controllable details. What is more, given the various marketing styles, there is a little 
standardization. This makes it difficult to compare between companies, let alone 
between sectors. As Hess and Dunfee (2007) note, today we find promising standards 
in the GRI guidelines, a typical pioneering infomediary. But application is voluntary. 
Thus not all firms are using this standard or comply with all aspects of it. Although 
companies are undoubtedly interested in knowing where they stand with respect to 
their direct counterparts, they will have little incentive to publish this information 
(especially not if it turns out that they are not on top of their sector). Once the 
information passes through the filter of infomediaries, standardization of the 
information is far easier to attain. Benchmarking and translation into comprehensible 
parameters is typically a task of intermediaries.xiv Improving comparability and 
comprehensibility will raise the benefits of CSR information for the users. The more 
significant groups of both users and disclosers benefit from releasing information 
under a mandated disclosure policy, the more improvement one can expect in the 
system and the more this information will be embedded in everyday decision making 
routines of users and disclosers (Fung et al, 2004). 
Of course, infomediaries will undoubtedly provide external verification. But 
reliability and adequacy of data also stand to gain. Professionals understand better 
what type of information a company can provide and what type is difficult if not 
impossible to provide. Furthermore, the intermediaries will contribute to unbiased 
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presentation of information (impartiality). This will not only objectively benefit 
consumers. It turns out that most stakeholders prefer information about CSR to be 
handed over by news media or certified third parties (See: Hess and Dunfee, 2007). 
 
Next to the efficiency criterion we also identified two moral criteria—freedom and 
autonomous development of moral virtues—in order to judge a transparency policy. 
As we see it, the autonomous development of the virtues will not be negatively 
affected by strengthening the role of infomediaries. After all, the procedural standards 
are closely connected to the development of moral virtues within the firm, such as 
truthfulness and integrity (see section 2.). If infomediaries strengthen these procedural 
standards (as we argued above), it seems reasonable to assume that they will enhance 
the development of informational virtues also. It is interesting to look back at the 
history of corporate financial reporting in this respect. In the 1920s corporate financial 
information was very diverse in scope and reliability (Van Overfelt 2007). Lies were 
as common as the truth. All this changed considerably as the quality and amount of 
information grew. The early infomediaries collected more and better information. 
Consequently, it became much harder for the individual firm to bluff its way through 
financial statements. The improvement of the procedural quality of the information set 
new standards and more and more companies felt the pressure to deliver truthful 
statements. Practice turned into a habit that was later endorsed by legal requirements. 
Of course, the importance of legal pressure must never be underestimated. At the 
same time, however, much of the standardisation and procedural enhancement of 
corporate financial information took place outside the legal framework and was only 
later on confirmed by it.  
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 Finally we have to consider freedom. We indicated that the proposal of the 
consumer federation increases the informational load on the company in such a way 
that it seriously limited company freedom to act. It also could jeopardise the privacy 
of workers and other parties involved. Are these arguments also relevant if the role of 
infomediaries is strengthened? Again the analogy with financial information streams 
can be helpful. Accountants usually are restricted by a privacy agreement prescribing 
that they cannot just hand over data to any third party. Likewise in the CSR world 
professional intermediaries can be bound by privacy guidelines. These can enhance 
the provision of more and better information without infringing on the rights of other 
stakeholders.  
 
8 The prospects of infomediaries in CSR transparency. 
 
Corporate financial disclosure is a complex, differentiated, high level information 
system. CSR information streams are nowhere near this highly sophisticated, world 
encompassing information system. The contrast may seem insurmountable. In that 
context it is inspiring to take a closer look at the situation of corporate financial 
disclosure at the beginning of the previous century (See e.g. Barton and Waymire, 
2004 and Van Overfelt et al. 2007). The financial infomediaries did not come all at 
once. In the early days they were marginal players, developing slowly. The system 
was in many respects defective. Initially, they developed mainly through market 
forces, indicating that the information was embedded. There was something in it for 
the user as well as the discloser. Still, their development was a crucial phase in the 
development of proper financial reporting. 
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 It is encouraging to see that CSR reporting likewise developed purely driven 
by market forces, again indicating the embedment of the information. Market forces 
also gave rise to early forms of CSR infomediaries. Especially interesting are players 
like Vigeo or Innovest. These intermediaries have specialised in collecting CSR 
information and have developed there own measurement tools. These players can be 
compared to the Standards and Poors of the financial counterpart, even if they are still 
in their infancy. The development of voluntary guidelines for CSR research for 
Europe (see footnote 17) is an indication of maturing taking place. There is no doubt 
that the quality of methodology used to collect and check CSR information has clearly 
improved over the past ten years. 
 How can the development of CSR transparency be promoted? In relation to 
this it is important to note that the rise of the financial reporting system was not a 
fully autonomous process. A crucial boost to the development of financial reporting 
systems was given by the American government when it set up a basic reporting 
framework in 1933-4. After that, it took at least 40 years of fine-tuning before a more 
or less smooth system developed.xv That is to say: market forces alone could not do 
the job. Government regulation was needed to force companies to come up with a 
certain type of information in a certain format. This extended the scope and reliability 
of the information collected by infomediaries considerably and consolidated their 
position as a vital player in corporate financial reporting.  
 If we accept the conclusion that the development of infomediaries is also 
necessary in relation to CSR reporting, this suggests that a basic legal framework is 
also needed here. This should lay down certain CSR information requirements and 
quality standards. Interestingly, it seems that the first steps of this legal development 
are taken in practice with respect to CSR reporting. In the Netherlands large public 
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companies are now legally obliged to report on environmental and social issues.xvi 
They have to publish this kind of information in order to provide a good 
understanding of the development, results and position of the company with respect to 
CSR. This requirement is based on European law (guideline 2003/51/EG; 
http://www.ez.nl/content.jsp?objectid=36790). xvii We perceive this as an indication of 
changing political forces. Even if Hess (2007) is right to point out that these initiatives 
are often weak. In the Dutch situation companies retain a lot of freedom in applying 
the guideline. In 2005 only 15% presented indicators about sustainability performance 
in their annual reports (Bartels, 2006).xviii Still, the financial reporting system also did 
not develop overnight. It was not until the financial crisis of the 1930’s that the 
momentum came about in American politics that created the legal frame for corporate 
financial reporting. It took decades for the system to develop and disseminate to all 
industrial countries. 
 
9 Conclusion 
 
The central question of this contribution is how a transparency policy ought to be 
organised in order to enhance the CSR behaviour of companies. The contribution is 
prompted by practical conflict over this issue. Currently, transparency policies of 
governments with respect to CSR are often based on self-governance of companies 
supported by governmental facilitation. NGOs complain that self-governance by 
companies is insufficient, if only because the information produced is far too limited 
to be valuable to consumer and interest groups. Accordingly, NGO's have come up 
with proposals for more stringent transparency policies. All these involve a 
governmental role that reaches beyond facilitation. 
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 In this paper we evaluated these proposals, using a framework taken over from 
administrative science. We distinguished three categories of policies: command and 
control, facilitation (or self-governing actors) and self-regulating subsystems. We also 
worked out three key criteria to evaluate these three types of policies: efficiency, 
freedom and virtue. Much attention has been paid to the facilitation policy, since that 
is currently used by most governments. By analyzing the Dutch situation we 
concluded that self-governance of actors fails, at least on the efficiency criterion. We 
then turned to the possibilities of using the idea of self-regulating systems. From an 
administrative theory point of view this policy differs fundamentally from command 
and control or facilitation. The last two aim directly at the micro-behaviour of actors. 
The self-regulating system policy aims at organizing the balance of power in a 
subsystem, such that the government objective is attained at a minimal cost.  
 A first attempt to instantiate this type of policy in CSR reporting by the Dutch 
Consumer Federation is rejected. It fails on the criteria of freedom and virtue. The 
costs involved would also be too high. Accordingly, we developed another 
instantiation of the self-regulating sub-systems policy. In this proposal infomediaries 
take centre stage. Infomediaries take care of many of the problems related to direct 
interaction between disclosers and users of information. 
 In the last part of the paper we developed an analogy between the early days 
of corporate financial reporting and CSR reporting today. It is promising to see that in 
both cases market forces pushed the various actors in the direction of more 
transparency. A crucial development in financial reporting was the rise of 
infomediaries. This development now seems under way in CSR reporting. Pushing the 
analogy between CSR reporting and financial reporting, however, means that 
governmental regulation is needed to consolidate the position of the infomediaries. 
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Figure 1: Transparency policy of government: an institutional framework 
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 This approach is, among others defended by NGOs. In an official response to the final report of the 
2004 EU Multi-Stakeholder Forum, some of the leading and most influential NGOs state that ‘Ensuring 
corporations are legally accountable to their stakeholders is essential. Only binding legal measures will 
establish a general incentive for responsible corporate behaviour that matches their general incentive to 
be profitable (http://www.foeeurope.org). 
ii
 Hess and Dunfee (2007) refer to a British telecommunications company reporting that it has one 
employee spending two or three days a week responding to demands of various parties – investors, 
community groups and consultancies – to fill in questionnaires about social responsibility practices. 
iii
 Cited in  Ministry of Economic Affairs (2007), page 51 
iv
 Berthelot et al (2003) distinguish an additional reporting mechanism, namely external sources of 
disclosure, such as newspapers or other media or research by third parties. In our framework, this 
category belongs to the self-regulation strategy, since this strategy includes the possibility that third 
parties provide CSR information about companies. 
v
 Merely threatening to regulate might also be effective, because companies often fear the high 
administration costs caused by legal requirements and try to prevent this by pro-actively meeting the 
stakeholders’ needs to transparency in CSR. 
vi
 Another example is the employability index developed by the council of Social Affairs and 
Employment in the Netherlands, which informs employees about the possibilities to develop their own 
employability in various sectors of industry (De Grip et al, 1999). 
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www.duurzaamheid.kennisnet.nl. 
viii
 NGOs even doubt the level of CSR of companies that belong to the top 5% of most transparent 
companies. For example, ABN Amro was judged the most transparent company in the Netherlands 
according to the transparency benchmark subsidized by the Dutch government. However, the NGO 
Milieudefensie awarded ABN Amro with the 2005 ‘Deceptive Image prize’ because of its financial 
involvement with the construction of oil pipe lines without any consideration of the high environmental 
risks (Milieudefensie, 2005). This illustrates that transparency is merely a necessary condition and not 
a sufficient condition for a high level of CSR. The benchmark is solely based on some formal criteria 
with respect to the format of the social report of the companies. 
ix
 MVOplatform (2006). Among the NGO's participating in this platform are Amnesty International, 
Consumentenbond, FairFood, Fair Trade Original, Fair Wair Foundation, FNV, Mondiaal, Greenpeace 
NL, Milieudefensie, Oxfam Novib, Pax Christi, SOMO, Stichting Max Havelaar, Stichting Natuur en 
Milieu  and VBDO. 
x
 Some companies already meet this condition. For example, Eosta, a Dutch fruit retail company, 
provides every piece of fruit with a sticker with a code. Through the internet, the consumer can trace 
the origin of the product as well the score in terms of product quality, environment and social 
responsibility (People Planet Profit, 2006, Vol. 5 (Sept.), pp. 5). 
xi
 A nice illustration of this problem is the financial instruction leaflet for banking products that the 
Dutch Authority Financial Markets made obligatory for the provision of complex financial products 
such as mortgages, single premium assurance policies, and investment funds. The instruction leaflet 
was intended to improve the transparency and the comparability of these products, and to protect the 
financial consumer. However, only seven percent of the consumers happened to read the leaflet. It was 
estimated to be both too vague and too complex (NRC, 2-7-2004). 
xii
 It is clear that the combination of control and advice by the same party is inherently problematic, as 
was made sufficiently clear by the unfortunate Arthur Anderson case, but one should realise that the 
market for CSR auditing is at present so small that forbidding the combination of both targets would 
probably end the life of CSR consultancy in the first place. If the role of infomediaries increases, 
standards for social auditor independence should be developed. 
xiii
 See CSRR-QS European voluntary guidelines for SRI research. More information on 
http://www.csrr-qs.org/ 
xiv
 Sector studies by SRI screening institutions provide at this moment the first examples of 
benchmarking in CSR. This information in general does not reach the public, but it does reach the 
companies themselves and is taken on with great interest. 
xv
 And as the series of corporate scandals at the beginning of this century indicates, the system is even 
now far from flawless. 
xvi
 Several European countries are also experimenting with legal requirements for CSR reporting 
including Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the UK and France (KPMG, 2005; Hess and Dunfee, 2007). 
Hess (2007) concludes that the laws in the UK and France are not more than weak compromises that do 
not appear to be much stronger than voluntary reporting initiatives. 
xvii
 Guideline 400 of the Council for the Annual Report (2003) provides recommendations for 
information about CSR in the financial report. Still, these guidelines are not obligatory. Small and 
medium companies do not have an obligation to present non-financial information in their annual 
report (VNO-NCW, 2006).  
xviii
 KPMG (2006) notes that in France firms also do not fully comply with the legal requirement to 
report on environmental and social impacts. Hess (2007) suggests that this is due to limited penalties 
for non-compliance and a lack of specific standard and guidelines. 
